Duterte's Foreign Policy, US and South China Sea

For ordinary folks, geopolitics in Eastern Asia this week looks like in a quandary primarily because of Duterte's earlier declaration that the Philippines was pursuing a more independent foreign policies. Although the Philippines has existing security alliances with the US, he previously talked of seeking closer ties with Russia and China. He also announced that the Philippines would no longer participate in joint patrols at the West Philippine Sea with the US, and on his recent working visit to Vietnam, he declared suspension of future joint war games between the US and the Philippines. Through all these, the US State Department simply pronounced that the US-Philippines alliance is ironclad, fanning the suspense for many. For the wily Duterte however, the opportunities are limitless along his course, but not without his usual detractors.

To understand all the goings-on, one must understand Duterte. There is no problem for those close to him who know the President, but for the naive and adversaries who are fond of prejudging his actions, they are bound to miss the boat. Put simply, the Philippines President is intelligent and has a strong personality. He is an alpha male who would not be afraid of engaging in poker play especially when he believes that he holds all the aces in his hands. Finally, he is a leader who would not enter the game without studying the players and understanding the issues at hand.

For instance, consider that the events in the South China Sea showed that the US is primarily concerned with freedom of navigation and not in China's intrusion to Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) where the latter admittedly is still showing considerable restraints. On the other hand, Duterte's concern primarily is EEZ over which the Hague Arbitration Court made rulings favorable to the Philippines, but which remains unaccepted by China. With no enforcement mechanism of the rulings by the United Nations, Duterte can only either use force or diplomacy to put the decision in effect. But the Philippines is no match to China when it comes to war. The only alternative then to reap the effects of the Hague Court decision is to use diplomacy thru bilateral talks that China prefers on matters concerning EEZ. This will dismiss multilateral negotiations that the US wants, where as a party the US will surely raise freedom of navigation issues that China disliked. The bottom line is that the Philippines and the US have separate distinct issues with China, and the Philippines can play its card better in bilateral talks instead of multi-lateral negotiations. After all, the Philippines alone holds an ace in the Hague Court decision which China can respect as a signatory to UNCLOS.

From the foregoing, it can be argued that the US and its allies have to take up with China the freedom of navigation issues separately from the Philippines pursuit of the Hague Court decision. The Allies cannot ride on the Philippines won case through multilateral talks as it will only complicate matters, and worse, it will unnecessarily place the Philippines case at risk. China's restraint thru limited intrusion to Philippines EEZ on the other hand can be construed as respect to UNCLOS and indication of willingness to recognize the Philippines rights. As a rising power, China can accommodate the Philippines triumph without prejudicing its image in the eyes of the world like being seen as a bully in the South China Sea.

As to Duterte's move to open up to China and Russia, it pertains more on economic and cultural fronts. For one, tourism demand for the Philippines in Russia is growing fast. China's market remains not fully explored by Philippines businesses, while the focus these days of Chinese investors is turned  away from the Philippines for being seen as a staunch US ally. When such image is removed, a closer relationship with the two nations will boost bilateral trades and interactions that would propel faster the Philippine economy. This move can also be interpreted as a future hedge against the economic clout of western powers in the Philippines, which constantly imperil the country whenever their interests are threatened by enlightened domestic policies.

The other pronouncements of Duterte stated above should not be seen as adversarial policies that will strain US-Philippines alliance. Rather, those must be treated as utterance to reinforce his aces in a poker play. The US, its Allies, China and Russia may respond positively or negatively but the reality is Duterte just raised his ante and the rest has to either call or fold.

To sum it all, the US-Philippine security ties in fact remain ironclad. It must be understood that in their foreign relations, issues affecting the United States can not always similarly pertain to the Philippines, and vice versa. These realities require President Duterte to pursue a more independent foreign policy that should only be more beneficial to most Filipinos, first and foremost.